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Abstract
We report an experiment in which subjects are not indifferent between real-money lotteries imple-
mented with randomization devices that are equivalent under the Reduction Axiom. Instead choice
behavior is consistent with subjective distortion of conditional probability, and this persists in treat-
ment conditions that control for (i) computational limitations and (ii) possible confounding by ratio
bias.
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1 Introduction
What specific factors lead to violations of the Reduction of Compound Lotteries Axiom? The question
is consequential for Expected Utility Theory’s (EUT’s) domain of descriptive validity. It is also conse-
quential for the design and interpretation of experiments. To date this question has not been examined
in a systematic fashion within the economics literature.
This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to determine whether the negative recency
effect – i.e. a subjective distortion of conditional probability – explains subjects’ choices between one-
stage and two-stage variants of a real-money lottery. The overwhelming majority of subjects (80%)
choose the one-stage variant of the lottery. The direction and strength of this effect survives (i) being
explicitly informed that the two lotteries are probabilistically equivalent, ruling out a miscalculation
errors explanation (77%), and (ii) controlling for the size of the sample space, which rules out a ratio
bias explantion (80%). This choice pattern is consistent with negative recency and inconsistent with the
Reduction Axiom, which in contrast requires indifference between the two variants of the lottery.
2 The Reduction Axiom
The EU representation of preferences is underpinned by the Reduction of Compound Lotteries Axiom.
In von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) it appears as Axiom 3:C:b (p. 26). In Samuelson (1952) it
appears in the definition of the objects of choice as being ‘simple’ lotteries, where any compound lottery
is reduced to a “simple lottery ticket whose prizes are all the possible prizes of the compound lottery
ticket, each evaluated with the compound probabilities that the classical algebra of probability defines.
...only algebra, not human behavior, is involved in this definition” (p. 671). The axiom is a necessary
underpinning of EU (Halevy, 2007).1
Under the Reduction Axiom a decision maker is indifferent between a two-stage compound lottery
and its ‘collapsed’, one-stage, probabilistically equivalent simple lottery. The Reduction Axiom limits
the scope of applicability of EU to preferences that obey this property, on the one and, and is a defining
characteristic of normative rationality, on the other.
The Reduction Axiom has become the focus of experimental investigation in connection with the
Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. EU-violating Allais-type choice patterns have been attributed to the joint
violation of the Independence and Reduction Axioms (Conlisk, 1989; Carlin, 1992). And choice patterns
in the Ellsberg setup, which are inconsistent with Subjective Expected Utility, have also been linked to
violations of the Reduction Axiom (Bernasconi and Loomes, 1992; Halevy, 2007). This literature has
concentrated primarily on establishing the fact of Reduction Axiom violations rather than testing for their
1See e.g. Segal (1990, Theorem 3); he also shows what combination of properties needs to be assumed if one is to forgo
the Reduction Axiom: the combination of (i) one-stage strict stochastic dominance, (ii) compound independence, (iii) time
neutrality and (iv) strong compound dominance.
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causes. The exception in this domain is contained in the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,
who explain violations of the Reduction Axiom through the isolation, certainty and pseudo-certainty
effects.2 Heretofore the question of whether Reduction Axiom violations can arise in other ways has not
been taken up in the economics literature.
3 The negative recency effect
The strong prediction that negative recency holds for particular types of two-stage lotteries provides both
the impetus for and the central hypothesis of the present experiment.
Negative recency is one aspect of the ‘law of small numbers’, which was introduced into the economics
literature by Rabin (2002).3 The extensive experimental literature on the negative recency effect is
summarized in Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991). The effect, which gives rise to the gambler’s fallacy,
continues to be borne out in experimental economics investigations in the lab (see Asparouhava et al.,
2009) as well as in the field, e.g. in the Maryland lottery’s “Pick 3” numbers game (Clotfelter and Cook,
1993), in the New Jersey lottery’s (pari-mutuel) three-digit numbers game (Terrell, 1994), and in the
Kansas City greyhound races (Terrell, 1998).
Under the law of small numbers, people misjudge and “exaggerate how likely it is that a small sample
resembles the parent population from which it is drawn” (Rabin, 2002, p. 775). As an empirical regu-
larity, people erroneously expect (a) the frequency distributions of small samples to closely approximate
the limiting frequency distributions, and (b) the ‘irregularity’ of small samples to be greater than that
typically generated by fair, memoryless randomization devices. It is the latter, negatively distorted con-
ditional subjective probability belief, that constitutes ‘negative recency’. Under negative recency, when
a memoryless randomization device generates a particular outcome ωi ∈ {ω1, ω2, ..., ωn} with objective
probability 1n , the subjective probability of a second draw yielding that same outcome ωi is less than
1
n .
The negative recency effect holds clear implications for preferences between one- and two-stage vari-
ants of a lottery: for lotteries with objectively identical win probabilities, subjects whose perception of
randomness is characterized by negative recency will prefer the one-stage lottery to its two-stage variant.
In other words, the Reduction Axiom’s requirement of indifference between one- and two-stage variants
is predicted to be violated under negative recency.
4 Experiment
This experiment is designed to test whether the negative recency effect causes the Reduction Axiom to be
violated. For implementing the one- and two-stage lotteries, simple and familiar randomization devices
2See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Keller (1985) found that the relative strength
of the certainty and pseudo-certainty effects is modulated by the form of the problem presentation.
3In the context of binary sequences, the negative recency effect is known as ‘alternation bias’.
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are methodologically preferable, and in this experiment we use dice.4
The experiment was conducted in pen and paper format at the experimental laboratory of the Karl-
sruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). Ninety students from different fields of study were recruited and
assigned to the three treatment conditions using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each treatment was imple-
mented across three sessions of 10 subjects each lasting 30 minutes on average. Subjects ranged in age
from 22 to 28, with an average of 24.1 years. 69% of the subjects were male. At the time of participating
in the study, all subjects were enrolled in an engineering or computer science degree program at KIT, and
had already completed at least one course in mathematics or statistics as part of their degree program.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were given written instructions describing the lottery and
their choice alternatives. After subjects had time to read the instructions, the experimenter demonstrated
the randomization devices to be used in the experimental procedure. Before distribution of answer sheets,
subjects were given the opportunity to seek clarification on any aspect of the experiment. Subjects
wishing to ask a question were individually led outside the laboratory room, where neither the question
nor the answer could be heard by the other subjects. After all participants completed their respective
answer sheets, the experimenter proceeded to implement the lottery for each subject using his/her chosen
randomization device. Standard laboratory protocols to minimize the risk of experimenter demand effects
were followed.
4.1 Base treatment condition
Participating subjects are individually presented with a real-money lottery in which they stand a 10%
chance of winning 100 Euro.5 The lottery is implemented by a random draw of one integer between 1
and 100, where the monetary prize is won if the integer is composed of two identical digits (11, 22, 33,
..., 100). In the event that non-identical digits are drawn, the subject’s payoff is zero. Each subject is
offered a choice between two objectively interchangeable randomization devices. Option 1 is one roll of a
100-sided die. Option 2 is two rolls of a 10-sided die.
Regardless of which device is chosen, the objective probability of winning 100 Euro is 110 . The null
hypothesis to be tested is that subjects display no preference bias toward either device, i.e. that the
proportion pˆ selecting the 100-sided die is 12 . The finding of a systematic bias toward either device is not
consistent with choice based jointly and solely on normative (rational) decision theory and probability
theory. In EUT this joint requirement is formalized in the Reduction of Compound Lotteries Axiom.
Rejection of the null hypothesis on a two-sided binomial test of pˆ = 0.5 implies rejection of Reduction
410-sided (pentagonal trapezohedron) and 100-sided (Zocchihedron) dice, as used here, generate sample spaces that are
familiar and convenient in the base 10 number system. The associated natural frequency representations of probability and
multiplicative operations carried out on these fractions involve lower ‘computation costs’ than with alternatives such as
4-sided (tetrahedron) and 16-sided (octagonal dipyramid) dice.
5The laboratory sessions were conducted in February and March 2011. In February the average US-currency value of
100 Euro was $136.45, while in March it was $139.90.
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Axiom. H0 : pˆ− 0.5 = 0, H1 : pˆ− 0.5 6= 0.
Rejection of this null hypothesis is also consistent with an alternative that maintains the Reduction
Axiom as part of a joint hypothesis. Where subjects are indifferent between the two devices under the
Reduction Axiom, nothing is lost if an additional cue or criterion tips choice toward one option or the
other. Here the alternative hypothesis would be that subjects differentiate lexicographically between the
devices when they are equally preferred under the Reduction Axiom.
We note that such a lexicographically augmented reduction axiom is not in keeping with the EUT of
rational choice literature, in which the only attributes to be legitimately (rationally) consulted are the
probabilities and payoffs of the reduced, single-stage, simple lottery. Furthermore, it is not in keeping
with the principle of parsimony.6
Subjects whose perception of randomness is characterized by the law of small numbers – and in
particular negative recency, under which conditional probability beliefs are distorted – may be expected
to differentiate between the two randomization devices. Because the 100-sided die implements the draw
in a single roll whereas the 10-sided die implements the draw in two sequential rolls, subjective distortions
of conditional probability beliefs can affect the subjective evaluation of the latter (10-sided) device but
not the former (100-sided) device. Specifically, as a result of negative recency the subjective (distorted)
conditional probability – of the second roll of the 10-sided die landing on the same digit as on the first
roll – is less than 110 . To the extent that subjects’ perception of randomness embodies negative recency,
ceteris paribus such subjects will display a preference for the 100-sided die. Thus the corresponding
alternative hypothesis is directional Hnr1 : pˆ− 0.5 > 0.
4.2 Zero computation cost treatment condition
The cognitive resources of any one individual being finite, the fact that computation and deliberation is
‘costly’ in terms of time, attention and mental effort entails that when confronted with particular types
of tasks, an individual may face a binding cognitive constraint which prevents full rationality (Pingle,
2010). As Simon (1955) observed, the rationality that a subject is capable of displaying is that which is
“compatible with the access to information and computation that are actually possessed” (p. 99).
Two-stage compound lotteries, as opposed to one-stage simple lotteries, require attention, reasoning
and probability calculation in order to be reduced into one-stage lotteries that are directly comparable
with other one-stage lotteries.
Although a remote possibility considering the training of the subject pool, it is conceivable that some
base case treatment condition subjects may not have premised their choice on a correct appreciation of
the fact that both randomization devices yield a win with probability 110 . In other words, it is conceivable
that ‘deliberation’ or ‘computation’ costs may prevent some subjects from making the choice they would
6One of the authors has suggested that this joint alternative be dubbed the lexicographic epicycle hypothesis.
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make in the absence of such costs (Carlin, 1992).7
In order to rule out this possibility, computation cost is reduced to zero in this treatment condition
through the inclusion of a paragraph that compares the randomization devices from the standpoint of
objective probability theory. The paragraph explains and makes explicit the fact that both randomization
devices offer the same 110 probability of winning 100 Euro.
The null and alternative hypotheses for this treatment condition are the same as in the base case.
4.3 Ratio bias control treatment condition
10-sided and 100-sided dice differ in the size of the sample spaces they respectively define. Whereas
these particular dice ensure familiarity and minimize computation costs, any systematic preference for
the single-stage lottery implemented with a 100-sided die could be due to either (a) the negative recency
effect or (b) an effect associated with the difference in sample spaces (10 vs. 100).
Indeed the logical possibility in (b) has a counterpart in the heuristics and biases literature: the ratio
bias effect. Studies exemplified by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) and Pinto-Prades et al. (2006) find that
in choices between lotteries having identical win probabilities, subjects choose the lottery representation
with the greater number of potential successes, i.e. the representation with the larger sample space.8
This preference for the ‘ratio of large numbers’ appears to persist even when the objective probability of
the large sample space option has a strictly inferior win probability, and even when subjects are explicitly
informed of the objective probabilities (zero computation cost) (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994).
In order to rule out ratio bias as a driver of the observed choice pattern, the sample space sizes are
equalized between the two devices in this control treatment condition. As before, option 1 is one roll of
a 100-sided die; the probability of winning is 10-in-100. Option 2 is amended to two rolls of a 100-sided
die, where attention is restricted to the final digit; whatever final digit is realized on the first roll, there
are 10-in-100 chances of realizing the same final digit on the second roll.
The null and alternative hypotheses for this treatment condition are the same as in the base case.
5 Results
Of the 90 subjects who participated in this real-money lottery choice experiment, 6 won the prize of 100
Euro. The data reveal a strong and consistent preference for the 100-sided die (the single-stage lottery).
Formal testing employs the binomial test. The Reduction Axiom is rejected in the base case treatment
condition as well as in the control conditions with two-sided p < 0.01. Under the one-sided test consistent
with the alternative under the negative recency effect Hnr1 : pˆ − 0.5 > 0 the null hypothesis is rejected
7As Pingle (2010) emphasizes, it is an imperative of good methodological practice to not overlook the possibility that
deliberation cost under scarcity of cognitive resources acts as a binding constraint on rationality.
8Small sample space option: a bowl containing 10 jelly beans, one of which is red. Large sample space option: a bowl
containing 100 jelly beans, ten of which are red.
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Table 1: Device preference for implementation of 1-in-10 chance to win 100 Euro. Also reported are
p-values of binomial test of H0 : pˆ = 0.5.
Treatment condition Simple lottery Compound lottery N two-sided one-sided
Base case 24 6 30 0.001431 0.000715
Zero computation cost 23 7 30 0.005223 0.002611
Equal sample space 24 6 30 0.001431 0.000715
with p < 0.001 in the base case and with p < 0.01 in the control conditions.9 Thus the rejection of the
Reduction Axiom is due neither to ‘miscalculation’ as the result of computation costs, nor to ratio bias
reflecting the sample space size difference between the 10-sided die and the 100-sided die.
6 Conclusion
These results hold implications for EUT, experimental design, and the interpretation of experiments.
The Reduction Axiom of EUT is a condition that applies to the binary preference relation (Â,∼,≺)
between simple and compound lotteries. It stipulates that decision makers will be indifferent between
a compound lottery and its mathematically equivalent simple lottery. It does not state that agents are
free to adduce additional criteria or cues upon which to base choice when, on the level of rational binary
preferences, indifference holds. Choice is required to follow rational preferences.
The present experiment’s results are consistent with the implications of the negative recency effect
and inconsistent with the Reduction Axiom. Multi-stage lotteries such as the ones considered here, which
repeatedly employ the same randomization device at each stage, are not descriptively interchangeable
with their logically equivalent single-stage variants. This study shows that Reduction Axiom violations
may not be restricted to the specific configurations of the Allais and Ellsberg Paradox experiments.
The implication for the design of experiments is that compound structures, whether part of a lottery’s
design or merely an incidental feature of the randomization device, can introduce biases into the resulting
experimental data if subjects’ perception of randomness is characterized by negative recency.
Equally, there are implications for the interpretation of experiments. Consider the St. Petersburg gam-
ble,10 which is clearly a multi-stage compound lottery. The Reduction Axiom is implicit in the standard
statement of the expected value of the St. Petersburg gamble: E(GStP) = 12 ·$2+(12 )2·$22+· · · . In the con-
text of coin tossing, empirical estimates of the first-order subjective distortion of conditional probability
(i.e. negative recency) place the effect at P (H|T ) = .6 (Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991). Accounting for
first-order negative recency, the subjectively distorted expected value of the St. Petersburg gamble is not
infinite but finite Ef-o(GStP) = 12 ·2+
∑∞
n=2
1
2P (H|T )P (T |T )n−2 ·2n = 1+0.3
∑∞
n=2 0.4
n−22n = 7.0 <∞.
9In the base case and the ratio bias control condition, the achieved statistical power is 0.939 (two sided) and 0.974 (one
sided). In the computation cost control condition the achieved statistical power is 0.859 (two sided) and 0.930 (one sided).
10typically either a hypothetical question or part of a thought experiment
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